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the open transaction doctrine, the cash or 
distributable share of accrued income and gain 
ultimately achieved by the service partner 
remains compensation.
The issue is at least symbolic of something 
deeply rotten about the tax base and tax equity. 
The top 25 hedge fund managers had aggregate 
compensation of 11 billion last year, a year in 
which the funds significantly underperformed 
the stock market as a whole.3 The monkeys 
picking stocks at random did better last year than 
the hedge funds. Managers are paid 2 percent of 
assets per year under industry standard practice, 
even when the monkeys do better. They get 20 
percent of profit, even if profit is under par. One 
should also never assume that this treatment is 
wise social engineering by Congress, exactly 
calibrating the cost of tax lost to purchase of what 
needs to be accomplished. The loophole is 
available for subpar performance.
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Bill of 20174 addresses 
carried interests with ambiguous language, 
which leaves current law largely intact however 
the ambiguity is resolved. The bill would adopt a 
new section 1061 of the code which says that the 
taxpayer’s net long-term capital gain with respect 
to a partnership interests received for services 
shall be computed using a three-year holding 
period, instead of the current-law, one-year 
holding period. There are at least two 
interpretations of that language. The narrowest is 
that section 1061 does not affect passed-through 
capital gain. Under current law, holding period 
for portfolio stock the funds sell is determined at 
the partnership level5 and the partner’s holding 
period for the partnership interest has no impact 
on whether gain passed through from the 
partnership is long term or short term. A partner 
can get long-term gain immediately if the 
partnership has held the sold asset for the 
requisite holding period. Because section 1061 
says nothing about the partnership’s calculation 
of holding period, the service partner might get 
long-term capital gain passed through under the 
old one-year holding period. Under that 
interpretation section 1061 would have an 
impact when the taxpayer, that is, the partner, has 
gain with respect to the partnership interest either 
by a sale of it or by a distribution with respect to 
the interest that is in excess of the partner’s basis. 
Partners in the funds do occasionally sell their 
partnership interests or get distributions in excess 
of basis, but the in usual course, the sale or 
exchange of the partnership interest in a fund 
occurs only in liquidation. By that time, all of 
the gain from the fund has been recognized by 
pass through on sale of portfolio assets and there 
is no further gain. The interpretation that section 
1061 does not affect passed-through gain makes 
section 1061 almost an empty gesture.  It will 
come up some, but not often.
Section 1061 might also mean the service 
partner can get a pass through of long-term 
capital gain, to which the lower rate applies, only 
if the partnership has held its portfolio stock asset 
for more than three years. Section 1061 does not 
explicitly say anything about partnership 
calculations of short- or long-term status under 
section 701(a)(2), but it might be implied, so as to 
prevent long-term status for stock assets held for 
under three years. That is a more restrictive 
interpretation of section 1061, but not world 
changing. Many of the funds either can and do 
hold their portfolio stocks for three years, or turn 
over assets so quickly they do not even try to 
qualify for even the current one-year holding 
period. Under either interpretation of section 
1061, this debate about the propriety of current 
law’s treatment of carried interests remains an 
important issue, beyond the modest reach of new 
section 1061, however modest that reach is.
I. The Defining Heritage
Under the defining heritage responsible for 
capital gain treatment, compensation is not 
supposed to be capital gain, regardless of the form 
by which it is achieved. Capital gain arises from 
British conceptions of capital under which the 
castle and manor (that is, capital) belonged to the 
next male heir, even if the capital had appreciated 
3
Kathryn Dill, “Top-Earning Hedge-Fund Managers Raked in $11 
Billion Last Year, Despite Disappointing Returns,” CNBC (May 17, 2017). 
The two highest-earning hedge fund managers were paid a total of $4 
billion. Id.
4
H.R. 1, 115th Cong , 1st Sess. section 3314, enacting IRC section 1061.
5
See section 702(a)(2).
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in value. Income arose as the interest accessible to 
living persons, encompassing “the annual 
produce, the grass, the apples and things of that 
sort.”6 The term “property” in section 1221, 
defining capital asset, comes directly from the 
British concept of capital. Property for capital gain 
means capital under the tradition. If something is 
income, it belongs by right to the income interest 
under the tradition and income tax gets a share of 
it at ordinary tax rates. Thus, the courts 
appropriately have held that income items 
including rent, royalties, interest, ordinary 
business income, and compensation are not 
capital gain under the traditional meaning even 
when they arise from the sale of something that in 
other contexts might reasonably be called 
property.7 Not all property, as the term might be 
understood in other contexts, qualifies as capital 
and thus does not qualify as capital gain.8 
Compensation under the tradition is the earner’s 
own money, and it did not have to be preserved as 
capital exclusively for the yet-unknown male heir. 
Those who earn the compensation may use it.
Capital gain is also the gain from the 
appreciation of capital. For compensation there is 
no capital that explains the gain. The traditional 
term, “capital,” has evolved into the tax term 
“basis.” Under current law, without basis, the 
gain from compensation is not the appreciation of 
capital, and is not capital gain.9 Compensation 
requires the investment of hard work, but work 
does not create basis; if it did, no wages could ever 
be taxed. Compensation is the product of work, 
not basis, and thus is never appropriately 
considered to be capital gain produced by capital.
Consistently, capital gain is also a relief from 
double taxation or double distortion under which 
both the investment in capital and the yield from 
capital are subjected to tax.10 The relief is partial: 
Much of the yield from capital, including rents, 
royalties, and interest, are ordinary income. 
Capital gain yields a reduction of tax not an 
exemption from double tax. Still, without an 
investment of capital, there is no yield from 
capital, no double distortion, and no capital gain. 
Compensation is not attributable to the 
investment of capital and so never qualifies as 
capital gain, once one understands the tradition 
and the meaning of the term.
Capital gain for compensation is always a 
loophole. Ordinary income, the Supreme Court 
has said, “is broad enough to include in taxable 
income any economic or financial benefit 
conferred . . . as compensation, whatever the form 
or mode by which it is effected.”11 Section 
1221(a)(3) now provides that artistic or literary 
property is an ordinary asset in the hands of the 
creator. Under prior law, when General Dwight D. 
Eisenhower sold the rights to his book, Crusade in 
Europe, for instance, he reported capital gain from 
his efforts.12 The subsection was adopted 
specifically to close what the committee report 
called a “loophole.”13 Section 83 was enacted first 
against a loophole under which restricted stock 
given as compensation was taxed as 
compensation neither when the stock was 
transferred to the executive nor when the 
restriction lapsed.14 We may appropriately call 
capital gain for compensation a loophole, under 
ordinary English usage.
Capital gain has been allowed to expand 
beyond its tradition. It originally applied only to 
interests that were preserved for the yet-unknown 
male heir, that no living person had access to, and 
that no living person could consume. Congress 
6
Walter Strachan, A Digest of the Law of Trust Accounts, Chiefly in 
Relation to Lifeowner and Remainderman 25 (1911) (footnote and citations 
omitted).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54 (1965) (gain 
from sale of bond was interest); Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, 
364 U.S. 130 (1960) (proceeds from sale of carveout was rent); Burnet v. 
Harmel, 287 U S. 103 (1932) (periodic royalties on oil and gas lease were 
like business-operating income although considered a sale of property 
under state law), superseded by statute, section 613A.
8
Gillette Motor Transport, 364 U.S. at 134.
9
Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487, 494 (8th Cir. 1974) (sale of 
partnership interest with zero basis was compensation not capital gain); 
Bryan v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 972, 981 (1961) (sale was compensation not 
capital gain). Cf. reg. section 1.83-3(a)(6) (indication that no transfer has 
occurred is that employee does not bear risk of loss).
10
Joseph Bankman and David A. Weisbach, “The Superiority of an 
Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income Tax,” 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1413, 
1418 (2006).
11
Commissioner v. Smith, 324 U.S. 177, 181 (1945) (options were 
compensation even if intended to give employee an ownership interest 
in the employer corporation).
12
Associated Press, “Eisenhower to Pay Tax as an ‘Amateur’ Writer,” 
The New York Times, June 2, 1948, at 31 (reporting that the IRS ruled that 
Eisenhower had capital gain from sale of Crusade in Europe because he 
was an amateur).
13
S. Rep. No. 2375, at 43-44 (1950).
14
See Walter J. Blum, “Restricted Stock Arrangements Reconsidered,” 
46 Taxes 598, 604-605 (1968).
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has also used the lower capital gains rates as a 
honey pot for specially connected people. Still, 
capital gain is not an always-open-season free 
range without rules. As long as most people pay 
ordinary income tax on their compensation, that 
establishes the tax principle that everyone should.
II. Step by Step to Error
The Kahns explain how capital gain for 
compensation of the manager of a fund arises 
under the logic of current law, step by step. Still, 
while their explanation fits current positive law, 
their explanation does not justify the capital gain 
normatively at the end of the steps. Each step, 
moreover, could and should have been contested 
and come out the other way, at least once you see 
the bad result. A bad step under current law is a 
self-inflicted wound by Treasury, prematurely 
closing off measurement of compensation under 
the open transaction doctrine. But more generally, 
compensation to a service provider remains 
compensation, even if the fund manager is made 
a partner in a partnership with tax-preferenced 
income.
The Kahns start by assuming that self-created 
property appropriately generates capital gain. 
They then argue that joint efforts at creating 
property also justify capital gain. They then leap 
to say that capital gain is fine for services 
performed for others. Or at least if that is not true 
generally, subchapter K makes it true. The Kahns 
say compensation must be measured when the 
manager gets an income interest in the 
partnership, and because the value of the interest 
then cannot reasonably be ascertained, it is 
deemed to be zero. The artificially deemed zero-
value compensation is then the end of any 
compensation, and we switch over in full to 
partnership mode, rather than compensation 
mode of taxation. Because the profits from a 
hedge, venture capital, or equity fund are capital 
gain at the partnership level, the fund manager, 
post-compensation measurement, gets to treat the 
gain as capital gain with the character passed 
through from the partnership. Each of the steps is 
both the result reached by current law, and 
without normative value. Bad results do not have 
a normative penumbra — any more than say a 
boil generalizes to describe the beauty of the 
human body.
A. Self-Created Property
The Kahns argue, first, that property created 
by labor — by sweat equity — is a capital asset. 
Courts have indeed held that the gain from 
building a house or a ship for a sale to a single 
customer will qualify as capital gain, as long as 
one is not also a distributor selling to customers 
(plural).15 Still, the results are not as clean or as 
good as the Kahns describe. The courts say that a 
major factor in determining whether real estate 
falls within the section 1221(a)(1) ordinary-
income exception from capital gain for holding 
for sale to customers is whether the seller has 
improved the property.16 When Congress 
recharacterized artistic and literary property as an 
ordinary asset to the creator, it appropriately 
called the prior law — capital gain for books and 
art — a loophole. Compensation is income and 
does not need to be preserved for the male heir, 
even if compensation is achieved by making 
things. A taxpayer who makes and sells 
something is making compensation, not different 
in substance from ordinary wages.
Capital gain on self-created assets is a 
violation of tax principle, but self-created assets 
have secondary importance in a complex 
economy. In a complex economy, taxpayers are 
not typically self-employed, if artists and writers 
are disregarded. The rule also does not allow sales 
of the product to customers. Even if available and 
tolerable in an unimportant sector, sweat equity 
should not generalize beyond its strict borders. 
Bad rules have no penumbra.
B. Services for Others
The fund managers are not building for 
themselves, however, but for others. The Kahns 
say that a group or joint creation of property 
15
Commissioner v. Williams, 256 F.2d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1958) (allowing 
capital gain ship for one buyer); Gangi v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1987-
561 (allowing capital gain on sale of condos that taxpayer built).
16
See, e.g., Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 422-423 
(5th Cir. 1976) (listing factors yielding capital gain, including 
improvements); Long v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-233 (developer 
hiring architect, applying for zoning relief, printing brochures, and 
taking deposits on 20 percent of units was enough development to make 
land an ordinary asset), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, per curiam, 772 F.3d 670 
(11th Cir. 2014) (ostensibly reversing Tax Court on another issue, which 
was that taxpayer sold a judgment rather than the not-yet-purchased 
land); Adam v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 996, 1003-1004 (1973) (holding that 
taxpayer was a passive investor, not improver).
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should also get capital gain once it is assumed a 
single builder gets capital gain. That is a dicier 
conclusion. Long-standing and unbeatable 
regulations provide that when a taxpayer receives 
services in exchange for their services, the fair 
market value of the services received is gross 
income.17 Thus, for example, if a tour guide 
organizes a trip to Europe and gets a free trip as a 
reward for the services, the value of the trip is 
income.18 If a carpenter and plumber exchange 
services in building the house, both sides have 
ordinary income, and there is an added basis in 
the house for the amount included in income. 
Indeed, even if they are both carpenters, there is 
no tax exemption for like-kind exchanges of 
services.
Exchanges of services within a family are best 
understood as tax-exempt support. In a profound 
sense, our income tax is based on households and 
transfers within the household, whether or not in 
exchange for services, are properly ignored. 
Informal exchanges of services among friends and 
neighbors are — and reasonably should be — 
tolerated as outside the tax system, even though 
rewards for services are taxable in theory.
When informal exchanges of services get too 
formal, however, for instance in a barter club, the 
IRS can and will collect tax on both parties to the 
exchange, including with information returns and 
backup withholding of tax.19 Billion-dollar hedge 
fund compensation is on the taxable side, neither 
informal nor small enough to be ignored as not 
worth the effort of enforcement.
Capital gain for self-service is sometimes an 
acceptable result, whereas capital gain for service 
to others is not. If, for instance, I spend 60 hours a 
week working on my investment portfolio, the 
value added by my services (if any) is not 
ordinary income under current law. The stock is 
the same and has not been created or improved. I 
have not built anything. I am buying and selling 
on the same market, so I am not performing a 
service of distributing the stock. The smart market 
says that the price on a broad market already 
reflects all public information on value, which 
implies that gains I get above what a well-
diversified portfolio would give is attributable to 
taking on too much risk or to sheer luck. There is 
well-based skepticism that I received 
compensation or built anything with my services.
It does not follow that financial advisers can 
get capital gain on compensation they earn by 
managing or advising others on what to invest in, 
even if the investment advice I give myself is 
treated as consistent with capital gain. Working 
for others as a financial adviser yields ordinary 
income both in theory and in practice. People 
providing financial services get no help from the 
rule that self-help does not turn capital gain into 
compensation.
The distinction between self-created property 
and working for others is unbridgeable. One 
indeed wonders why self-created property ever 
comes up in these discussions. Is the argument 
that because some compensation avoids ordinary 
tax, it all must?
C. Partnerships
Under current law, a partnership with a tax-
favored source of income may pay a partner who 
provides services by giving the service provider a 
share of the tax-favored income the partnership 
has achieved. Under subchapter K, governing 
taxation of partnerships, the character of an item 
as capital gain or ordinary income is determined 
exclusively at the partnership level.20 If the item is 
long-term capital gain or tax-exempt income to 
the partnership, it is also capital gain or tax-
exempt income to the partner. That the share is 
given to the service-provider partner only as a 
quid pro quo for the services provided does not 
matter as long as the services were performed in 
their “capacity as a partner.” The service-
providing partner has ordinary income from the 
compensation for services only as if the services 
are performed, not in their capacity as a partner21 
— whatever that means. Subchapter K thus 
allows an alchemy turning lead into gold, that is, 
compensation for work done becomes not 
17
Reg. section 1.61-2(d)(1) (1960).
18
Rev. Rul. 64-154, 1964-1 C.B. 72.
19
See, e.g., IRS Publication 525, “Bartering,” Example 3 (member of 
barter club has ordinary income from claim on arising from services); 
Form 1099-B, “Reporting Income from Barter Exchange”; reg. section 
31 3406(b)(3)-2 (providing for reporting of income and backup 
withholding by barter exchanges).
20
Section 702(b) by reference to section 702(a)(2).
21
Section 707.
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ordinary income but tax-favored income if the 
partnership has a source of tax-favored income to 
share with the partner.
The alchemy of ordinary lead into capital gain 
gold or better is limited by tax-minimization tax 
planning, which is supposed to look at both 
parties to a transaction. A distributive share given 
to the service provider means the tax-favored 
item is diverted from other partners, so the 
alchemy is useful only if the other partners cannot 
use the tax favor as well as the service partner can. 
Corporate partners, for instance, pay the same tax 
on capital gain as on ordinary income so they do 
not usually mind diverting capital gain to a 
service-providing partner who will get a lower tax 
rate on capital gain instead of paying with tax-
deductible cash. Tax-exempt investors also can 
give up capital gains character to service partners. 
If the services are capital expenditures, the 
compensation would be basis, not an immediate 
deduction, which limits the value of 
“compensation” characterization to the paying 
partners. Compensation can also be written up as 
for services “not in capacity as a partner,” or a 
guaranteed payment which would give the 
partnership a compensation deduction in 
computing its taxable income. The alchemy of 
converting compensation into capital gain is thus 
useful only because the other partners have 
limited use for a compensation deduction. Still, 
when giving tax-favored items to high-bracket 
service providers minimizes tax, the partnership 
can be used, like alchemy, to transform 
compensation from ordinary income (lead) into 
something better.
The ability of a partnership to turn ordinary 
compensation into capital gain or better is silly, or 
to use a technical term — mashugana. Subchapter 
K, governing partnerships, should never be able 
to put a blanket over compensation and hide it. 
Subchapter K is supposed to be the servant of 
substantive tax law. Except for minor 
administrative or procedural issues, where 
convenience is worth a (slightly) different result, 
if subchapter K and substantive law outside of 
subchapter K diverge, it is subchapter K that is in 
error.
There is nothing in the partnership relations 
that justifies a distinction from any other service 
provider. A partner performing services is an 
agent of the partnership,22 just as an employee, 
officer, or independent contractor is an agent of 
the business for whom the services are provided. 
We can create a spectrum of service providers: 
Some service providers are paid straight salary; 
some employees are offered a profit-sharing plan 
as a fringe benefit; some agents get substantial 
bonuses measured by performance; some get a 
trivial guaranteed salary and get almost all their 
pay according to outcome; and some service 
providers get paid only on commission or by a 
share in the output. Some service providers work 
under close supervision; some are independent; 
and some give orders to others. All have ordinary 
income for their compensation. At no place along 
the spectrum should it matter that the principal 
and agent cross off the “employee” label or 
“independent contractor” on their contractual 
papers and substitute “partner.” There is no 
substantive cutoff along the spectrum. Service 
partners are still service providers, with a profit-
sharing plan, entitled to no special deal.
The right rule, in lieu of section 702, is that 
compensation is ordinary income as received if it 
is compensation at either the partnership or the 
partner level. Some partnerships, in law, 
accounting, architecture, or other services, make 
only compensation be judged either at partner or 
at partnership level. But the managers of venture 
capital funds, equity funds, or hedge funds work 
for funds that make capital gain from 
appreciation of stock purchased by the fund. The 
work they perform for the fund is rewarded by 
compensation even when the fund has only 
capital gain.23
It is not hard to identify compensation. The 
Kahns use examples of managers of funds who 
22
See, e.g., Uniform Partnership Act, section 301 (1997) (partner is 
agent of the partnership).
23
If the partner has compensation income, the partnership should 
probably be treated as having a compensation expense at the same time 
and amount. See section 83(h). If the law did not give the partnership a 
deduction, the parties should ordinarily structure the payment as 
compensation for services not in capacity as a partner, deductible by the 
payer. Still, an alternative, asymmetrical treatment in which the service 
provider has ordinary income and the partnership has given up a share 
of capital gain should not be beyond the pale. The asymmetry would 
resemble other examples. Architect fees, for example, are capital 
expenditures, ordinary income to the recipient, but only basis to the 
payer. Section 264(a)(1) makes expenses otherwise deductible as 
business or production of income expenses into nondeductible expenses 
when the expenses are costs of tax-exempt interest, even when the 
expenses are ordinary income to the recipient.
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contribute no capital. The managers in the 
examples have zero basis and zero capital for their 
share. All their return is explained by their 
services. In other examples, however, service 
managers might also contribute capital, as have 
prior earnings left in the partnership. Partnership 
shares having basis are different shares from 
compensation shares, and those shares should be 
able to participate in capital gain or other tax-
favored income of the partnership just as other 
capital partners do. But partnership shares, like 
corporate stock, are divisible.
When the service partner has some capital 
shares with basis, there is danger of allocation to 
the service partner that is in fact compensation 
but falsely characterized as if it were a return of 
tax-advantaged income on the capital shares. It is 
not a difficult nor unusual enforcement problem. 
A service partner who is getting a larger share of 
tax-advantaged income of the partner, 
disproportionate to capital contributed or 
earnings left undistributed, and larger than what 
the partnership as a whole gets for the year as a 
percentage of capital is getting compensation and 
not a return on capital. These cases can be rooted 
out by the strong arm of the law.
There is also danger of an insider service 
partner claiming basis (that is, capital) for confetti 
debt used to acquire a capital share in the 
partnership. Debt is respected in the tax law only 
because payment of the debt has a discounted 
expected present value equal to the face amount 
of the debt; service-partner debt needs to be a cash 
equivalent. Service-partner debt for purchase of a 
partnership share might trigger an alert for 
special attention, because the debt does not have a 
value equal to the face amount paid, but it is not 
an insurmountable problem for ordinary 
enforcement of the law. Many transactions 
respected among arm’s-length parties are recast 
when employer and service provider are 
involved. A bargain purchase between strangers 
is not a realization event, for example, but an 
employee has immediate income from a bargain 
purchase from his employer.24
D. Open Transition
A fund manager who receives an income 
interest in the fund has nothing upon which to be 
taxed. Nothing has been earned yet, and nothing 
has accrued. Receipt of the interest is an open 
transaction that avoids tax because value is not 
ascertainable. If the interest is traded on an 
established market, is sold soon enough for the 
sale to establish value, or consists of known future 
cash flows with a calculable net present value, 
then the compensation transaction is closed based 
on known value. Absent that, compensation is 
measured when the service provider achieves a 
distribution or at least a distributable share of 
partnership income. An open transaction has two 
sides: deferral, because taxing early does not work 
right, and ordinary taxation latter when the 
results can be fairly measured. The general open 
transaction of current law was ruptured, however, 
because Treasury and the IRS stopped the second 
step.
Carried interests became a serious problem 
because the IRS ruled that the fund manager 
could get their interest in the partnership, taxing 
the interest as if it were worthless, and that that 
transfer of the deemed-worthless interest ended 
all future possibility of measuring compensation. 
The service partner thereafter got access to the 
mashugana section 702 rule that the compensation 
element is ignored if the partnership level has 
capital gain. A partnership profits interest is an 
interest that would give the partner no 
distribution if the partnership were liquidated 
immediately. In Rev. Proc. 93-2725 the IRS held that 
it would not tax profits interests when issued, and 
would instead wait until partnership income (or 
capital gain) was passed through to the partner, 
conceding years of litigation in which the IRS had 
experienced mixed results. In 2005 the IRS also 
announced its intent to tax capital interests only 
as measured by the amount that would be paid to 
the partner on an immediate liquidation, at the 
time of issuance, even when a substantial risk of 
forfeiture of the interest lapses at a later date.26 The 
fund managers under the industry standard 
24
Section 83(a)(1) and (2).
25
Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-1 C.B. 343.
26
Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221, announcing proposed section 4.03 
to Rev. Proc. 93-27.
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practice get their interests in 20 percent of future 
fund profits, and a future 2 percent annually of 
fund assets at a time when there is no value to 
them from an immediate liquidation. The 
managers have not performed any services yet, 
and have not added any value to the investors’ 
contributions. They have not earned anything. 
They always have zero liquidation valuation for 
their interest.27
It would be possible to find substantial value 
in the fund manager’s interest at time of issuance 
by looking backwards from the result. Valuation, 
under the only available theory, is the net present 
value of the expected future cash flows. If we 
apply the known future cash flow retrospectively, 
that net present value can be substantial. If, for 
instance, an equity fund managers are given an 
interest at start of the tax year and has 
distributable cash of $1 billion from their 20-2 
share by the end of the year, we can discount the 
$1 billion by a reasonable risk-free discount rate, 
say 5 percent, and the managers would then have 
net present value of $952 million at the start of the 
year, which would be ordinary compensation 
income. The volatility or riskiness of results 
would be met by giving those managers who end 
up with nothing by year-end, a zero net present 
value at the start of the year. By taxing both the up 
leg and down leg of outcomes according to what 
happens, we can take account of volatile possible 
results and, overall for the industry, we will be 
taxing expected net present value at the start of 
the year, on average. Retrospective valuation both 
captures what happens to any one partner and 
captures the expected value.
Liquidation value, by contrast, is not value. 
Yes, before any performance of services or 
appreciation, the manager can expect no 
distributable cash on their interest from an 
immediate liquidation. They must perform, or at 
least ride the market to appreciation to earn 
anything. But that does not mean that manager 
would willingly leave the interest out on the curb 
on trash day as worthless. It is, after all, a platform 
for making, for example, $l billion. Do not discard 
this opportunity!
Valuing compensation when the 20-2 platform 
is issued would be a bit like valuing a Stanford 
MBA upon graduation. Stanford MBAs make $3 
million on average in the 20 years after 
graduation,28 but future salary depends on talent, 
work, and happenstance as well as on education. 
For those who go off to Fiji to beachcomb, die 
tragically, or bet on the wrong product, the MBA 
is not worth anything. Some will make much 
more than $3 million. Just as it would be silly to 
tax the MBA on present value at graduation on 
what might be achieved, so the real value, 
discounted present value of the future cash flows, 
is not ascertainable on issuance of the 20-2 
interests, except by retroactive taxation. The 
future income has not been earned and it is not 
ascertainable in amount. It has not accrued under 
generally accepted accounting principles. Trying 
to tax the unearned future income when the 
managing partner is given the platform for future 
profit would be premature and unreasonable.
Early taxation of a service interest is a terrible 
way to tax compensation. The fair market value of 
a service partner’s interest when issued can be 
given value by the market, in bargaining between 
sellers and buyers, but the value so set will be 
systematically too low. Outsiders will make some 
sort of assumption about the contribution the 
service provider will add to the fund, but as 
outsiders they need to assume the risk the 
manager is a “lemon” and protect themselves by 
assessing value too low.29 That means that every 
service partner who is slightly better than a lemon 
will add value to their share that cannot be 
captured at the outset. Indeed, even if there is 
some valuation for the partnership interest at the 
time the service partner receives it, the 
identification of compensation needs to tax some 
of the subsequent gain as service-caused gain. The 
initial tax cannot capture it.
27
Even a profits interest or capital interest with no distribution upon 
immediate liquidation is taxable if the cash flows from the interest are 
certain; the interest is publicly traded; or the partner is taking the interest 
to sell it; but those exceptions never show up in the standard industry 
practices.
28
John A. Byrne, “The Most Lucrative Seven-Figure MBA Degrees,” 
Poets & Quants (Oct. 13, 2014), reporting findings that Stanford MBAs 
make $3 million in the 20 years following graduation. This is not an 
attempt to compute the value added by the degree. Stanford applicants 
start with talent and connections, and they might make as much going to 
Wharton or if they choose a different career.
29
The argument is a variation of George Akerlof, “The Market for 
‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,” 84 Q. J. 
Econ. 488 (1970).
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The only rationale for not taxing a partnership 
interest with no immediate liquidation value is 
the open transaction rationale. If the interest is 
traded on an established market, has such a 
predictable cash flow so that net present value of 
the cash flow is a reliable measure of value, or the 
partner sells the interest soon enough after 
receiving that the sale price is a reliable measure 
of the value of the interest when received, the 
partner has compensation from the receipt of the 
interest. Whatever else might be said in favor of 
not taxing partners on receipt of their interest falls 
away if the value of the interest is reasonably 
ascertainable. The open transaction doctrine, 
however, also has a second half, which is that 
when the value of the compensation is earned and 
becomes ascertainable, the compensation is still 
ordinary-income compensation.
It was an error for Treasury to say that the 
issuance of the partnership interest is the end of 
the effort to measure the manager’s 
compensation. None of a manager’s subsequent 
return on his partnership interest can be 
attributed to capital because the manager has not 
contributed any capital. Letting the manager into 
the status of partner and ending the compensation 
element means the manager thereafter has the la-
la rule of passthrough of partnership income, 
with a character of whatever it is to the 
partnership. The second step of the open 
transaction doctrine, taxation of the compensation 
when its value becomes clear, never happens. 
Letting the manager have zero compensation both 
at issuance of the interest and at distribution or 
allocation of a distributable share of the cash that 
gives the interest its value is like the loophole that 
section 83 was enacted to prevent, under which 
restricted stock compensation was taxed neither 
when transferred nor when the restriction lapsed.
Letting the executive get out of the 
compensation measurement with a zero-tax event 
is the sad end of an endeavor by Treasury, over at 
least two generations, to prevent premature 
compensation events taxed falsely at zero value 
from transforming the property from 
compensation into capital gain. For generations, 
compensation tax planners had asked Treasury to 
value compensatory tax options as the bargain 
that the option would give to the executive if the 
option were exercised immediately. For options 
with no initial bargain, the gain the executive 
made at exercise would be capital gain and only if 
sold. Treasury resisted premature taxation of 
stock options, at zero “liquidation” value, for 
more than two generations so to prevent 
executives from paying tax zero tax on their stock 
options and then reporting subsequent gain as 
capital gain.30 Then the partnership people found 
a way to get zero valuation by a premature taxable 
event, before anything was earned, with the errors 
of subchapter K partnership tax and so avoid all 
compensation. This is exactly what Treasury had 
resisted despite much hard lobbying for many 
years.
The zero-taxed carried interest is different 
from stock given as compensation when it has 
value. When stock compensation is included in 
income, the employee gets a basis equal to the 
FMV included in income. That basis, sometimes 
called “tax basis” or basis from being taxed, is like 
an investment and subsequent gain on the stock 
and is thereafter treated as capital gain. We treat 
the executive shareholder as if they had 
purchased the stock compensation for cash 
because the executive could have been paid 
compensation cash and purchased the shares for 
their value on the open market. For outside 
shareholders who have just invested the FMV for 
the stock, the gain is appreciation on basis, 
because of forces beyond the taxpayer’s control. 
Corporate-level tax on the earnings the executive 
has created is also a fine rationale for letting 
subsequent shareholder gain, from the same 
earnings, qualify as capital gain, even if the 
shareholder-executive caused the gain.31
Partnership interests taxed at zero when 
issued are not the same. The partner comes out of 
30
See, e.g., reg. section 1 83-7 (2004) (stock options are taxable at 
issuance usually only if sold on established market); for other attempts 
to prevent premature taxation that gets into capital gain position, see 
reg. section 1.83-3(a)(6); reg. section 1.83-3(a)(7), examples 2 and 4 
(employee must have capital to lose or the stock is not transferred yet).
31
Sometimes stock appreciation is due at least in part to the effort of 
the employee who has been given the stock compensation. But we give 
shareholders capital gain on stock caused by their own efforts in part as 
relief from double corporate tax. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 59-325, 1959-2 C.B. 
185 (acquiescing in giving Jack Benny and Groucho Marx capital gain on 
sale of stock holding assets that amounted just to the comedians’ 
services). Once the corporation has paid tax on the earnings the 
shareholder caused, it is reasonable to give lower tax on the stock to 
ameliorate double tax of corporate income at both the corporate and 
shareholder levels. See, e.g., section 1(h)(11) (giving capital gain for 
corporate dividends). For the fund manager, however, getting a 
partnership interest is not subject to double corporate tax.
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
©
 2017 Tax A
nalysts. A
ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
DEBATING TAX
1606  TAX NOTES, DECEMBER 11, 2017
the issuance with zero basis or capital. Zero basis 
cannot explain the future returns as a return on 
capital invested. The partner has no basis, no 
capital invested. It is all return to services 
provided — that is, compensation.
If the managing partner pays tax on interim 
distributable partnership income, but does not 
withdraw it, the managing partner does have a 
separate interest in the partnership, which is not a 
compensatory interest and not part of the 
ordinary-income closing of the compensatory 
open transaction. Taxed but undistributed income 
is like basis achieved by purchase. A partner has 
basis in distributable income not distributed.32 
Basis in the distributable but undistributed claim 
on earned amounts is justification for treating the 
subsequent income, if any, earned on that claim as 
return on capital, including if the return on the 
capital is tax-exempt bonds or tax-favored capital 
gain.
If a partner has both basis from a capital 
investment, or a basis from prior tax, and also a 
claim derived from services performed, 
one should worry that the manager in charge can 
claim too large a return of capital when the claim 
is really attributable to his continuing services. 
The investors would not object given the services. 
Still an agreement that gives the managing 
partner a return on capital accounts that is no 
larger than what the partnership has made overall 
for the year would not seem to be abusive, if 
nothing else is going on.
The principle that compensation is ordinary 
income is a strong one. Compensation is the 
normative heart of the income tax. Current law to 
the contrary needs to be fixed. The system for 
fixing it needs to be clean in theory and clear, but 
current law does need to be fixed. Finishing up 
the open transaction doctrine, as required by the 
logic of the doctrine, would reach the income — as 
it is earned — as ordinary income. Even better, 
section 702 needs to be amended so that capital 
gain on the partnership level will not 
mischaracterize compensation for partner 
services. The Kahns, while explaining rationales 
for current law, do not justify the capital gain 
result.
A Response to the Defense of Eliminating 
Capital Gains Treatment for Carried Interest
by Jeffrey H. Kahn and Douglas A. Kahn
We recently published an article 
demonstrating that the current tax treatment of 
carried interests, under which some partnership 
distributions to the holders of those interests are 
characterized as capital gains, is proper as a 
matter of good tax policy.33 We contended that the 
widespread antagonism to that tax treatment was 
wrong and based on a failure to account for the 
nature of a partnership and the proper 
characterization of partnership distributions for 
federal tax purposes. We refer to that article as 
“Fallacious Objections.” Calvin H. Johnson has 
written an article in response (see above), which 
we refer to as the “Erroneous Defense article.” In 
that article, Johnson does not dispute that current 
tax law treats the distributions in question as 
capital gains, and he graciously acknowledges 
that Fallacious Objections provides a fair 
description of the rationale for the current law. 
However, Johnson maintains that the current 
treatment offends good tax policy and should be 
changed. As one might expect, we disagree and 
will seek to show in this article that Johnson’s 
thesis does not withstand scrutiny.
Before discussing the Erroneous Defense 
article, we briefly describe what constitutes 
carried interest and the basis of our contention 
that the current tax treatment of carried interests 
is consistent with tax policy. The support for our 
position is more fully set forth in Fallacious 
Objections.
I. The Meaning of Carried Interest
A carried interest is the term used to describe 
a profits interest in a partnership that invests in 
equities. Typically, the partnership will be a 
limited partnership or a limited liability company 
to which several investors will contribute capital 
in exchange for a partnership capital interest. A 
“partnership capital interest” refers to a 
partnership interest that provides rights to both 
the properties that were contributed to the 
32
Section 705(a)(1)(A).
33
Kahn and Kahn, supra note 1.
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partnership and to the profits earned by the 
partnership. A “partnership profits interest” 
refers to a partnership interest that provides 
rights only to the subsequent profits earned by the 
partnership and does not provide rights to the 
capital that was contributed by the investors. The 
partnership will invest in equities to be selected 
by one partner, called here managing partner, 
who has expertise in investing. The managing 
partner contributes little or no capital to the 
partnership. Instead, he contributes the right to 
his future services in managing the investments in 
exchange for which he receives a partnership 
profits interest. In many cases, the partnership 
invests in depressed companies, and the 
managing partner uses his expertise to turn those 
companies around so that they can be sold for a 
substantial profit. The profit from the sale of the 
stock of those companies will be treated as capital 
gains. Typically, the partnership profits interest 
that the managing partner receives in exchange 
for his promise to perform future services 
provides for a right to 20 percent of the 
partnership’s future profits.34 The 20 percent 
partnership profits interest that the managing 
partner holds is referred to as a carried interest.
II. The Thesis of Fallacious Objections
The distributions made by a partnership to its 
partners have the same character to the partners 
that the income from which the distributions were 
made had to the partnership.35 To the extent that a 
distribution to a partner is attributable to what 
was long-term capital gain to the partnership, it 
will be characterized as long-term capital gain to 
that partner.36 Because most of the amounts 
distributed to the partners of an equity 
investment partnership will be attributable to 
long-term capital gain income of the partnership, 
most of the distributions to its partners will be 
treated as long-term capital gains. So, most of the 
distributions of 20 percent of the partnership’s 
profits to the managing partner will constitute 
long-term capital gains to that partner. It is that 
characterization of the managing partner’s 
distribution as capital gains to which Johnson and 
others object.
Our thesis in support of the current treatment 
of the partnership distributions to a managing 
partner rests on two elements. One element is that 
not all the income produced from a person’s labor 
is treated as ordinary income. In many cases, such 
income is treated as capital gains. An important 
example of that treatment arises when a person 
invests in an item and then expends considerable 
labor to improve the item before selling it (so-
called sweat equity). The completed item is 
sometimes called “self-created property.” The 
gain on the sale of self-created property is partly 
attributable to the capital contributed by the seller 
in his purchase of the item and partly attributable 
to the seller’s labor. For example, Helen puts 
considerable time and effort into researching 
companies before investing in their stocks. She 
later sells the stocks for a sizable profit that is 
partly attributable to the capital she invested and 
partly to her labor. Yet, all the profit Helen earned 
on the sales is a capital gain.
The second element rests on how both state 
business law and federal tax law treat 
partnerships. For some purposes, a partnership is 
treated as an entity separate from its partners. For 
some other purposes, a partnership is treated as a 
fiction representing the aggregate interests of the 
several partners. For purposes of characterizing 
the income recognized by a partner because of an 
allocation to him of the partnership’s income, the 
partnership is treated as an entity and the 
partner’s income is characterized at the 
partnership level. The concept of a partnership is 
that several persons combine their capital and 
labor in the hope that the synergy will produce 
more income than their investments or efforts 
would produce if they acted alone. The profits 
that are earned are not income of each partner; 
34
Also, the managing partner usually receives an annual fee of 2 
percent of partnership profits to compensate for his services. That fee 
will be treated as ordinary income to the managing partner.
35
Section 702(b). It is not the distributions from the partnership that 
are taxable to a partner. The partnership’s income is allocated among the 
partners at the end of the partnership taxable year regardless of whether 
any distributions were received by the partner. Section 702(a). But, the 
source of the objections to carried interest is that the managing partner 
receives partnership distributions and is taxed at capital gains rates. For 
convenience, we refer to the partnership distributions as the source of 
the capital gains treatment.
36
Id.
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rather they are the partnership’s income as a 
separate entity. Each partner is taxed on his share 
of the partnership’s annual income regardless of 
whether it is distributed to him or her.37 A partner 
is not taxed on a partnership distribution except 
to the extent that cash is distributed in excess of 
the partner’s basis in his partnership interest.38 So 
even if no distribution is made to a partner, he will 
be taxed on his share of the partnership’s income 
for that year. For convenience, we refer to the 
distributions the managing partner receives as the 
source of the capital gains treatment.
The partnership income allocable to a 
managing partner is not compensation for work 
that she performed. The payment she received for 
her services was the receipt of the partnership 
profits interest she acquired on the formation of 
the partnership. The partnership income that is 
allocated to her is income earned by the property 
interest she holds (that is, her partnership profits 
interest). The partner acquired her partnership 
interest in exchange for her agreement to provide 
services to the partnership.39 The partnership 
profits interest constitutes an advance payment 
for those services.
A proposed regulation promulgated in 2005 
states that the receipt of a partnership profits 
interest is a taxable event to the recipient under 
section 83.40 Previously, after some litigation, the 
IRS ruled in Rev. Proc. 93-2741 that the receipt of a 
partnership profits interest for services is not 
income to the recipient unless one of several 
exceptions applied. While, if finalized, the 2005 
proposed regulations would replace that ruling, 
the ultimate result reached by the 2005 proposed 
regulations would be similar. That is because the 
2005 proposed regulations establish a safe harbor 
under which the value of a partnership profits 
interest will be deemed equal to its liquidation 
value if some requisites are satisfied.42 Since the 
holder of a partnership profits interest has no 
rights to the capital contributed to the partnership 
and since a newly formed partnership has not yet 
earned any profits, the liquidation value of the 
managing partner’s partnership profits interest is 
zero. For that reason, under either Rev. Proc. 93-27 
or the 2005 proposed regulations, the recipient of 
a carried interest will not incur any tax liability. As 
we will see, Johnson proposes that that rule be 
changed.
III. A Critique of Johnson’s Thesis
The principal targets of criticism of carried 
interests are hedge fund managers and equity 
fund and venture capital fund managers. Those 
who are successful in those fields receive large 
sums of money that are taxed at capital gains 
rates. Johnson and others consider this a loophole 
that should be closed. The sizable amounts 
involved incite their ire.
Johnson emphasizes that compensation for 
services should never be taxed at capital gains 
rates. We have no quarrel with that proposition. 
The difficulty is in determining what constitutes 
compensation for services. We will elaborate on 
that point later in this article.
A. Compensation for Services
The thrust of Johnson’s position rests on his 
characterization of partnership distributions to 
managing partners as compensation for their 
services. Indeed, that is the common theme of all 
those who dislike the capital gains treatment for 
carried interests. As noted in our Fallacious 
Objections article, while that characterization has 
some superficial appeal, it is fundamentally 
wrong. The amounts received by the managing 
partners are a return on property they hold and 
are not compensation for their services. The 
following examples illustrate the error in 
characterizing those payments as compensation.
Example 1: Several investors form the XYZ 
limited partnership to invest in the stock of start-
up companies and sell for a profit the stocks of 
those companies that succeed. Garry and Sheila 
are lawyers. The XYZ partnership hires Garry and 
Sheila to perform legal services for the 
partnership. As compensation for their services, 
the partnership gives limited partnership profits 
interests in XYZ to Garry and Sheila. Those 
partnership interests are not forfeitable. Shortly 
37
Sections 702(a), 704.
38
Section 731(a).
39
The arrangement often provides that the service provider will 
receive an additional amount for her services, but her primary 
compensation is the receipt of the partnership profits interest.
40
Prop. reg. section 1.721-1(b)(1).
41
Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343.
42
Prop. reg. section 1.83-3(l). See also Notice 2005-43, 2005-1 C.B. 1221.
For more Tax Notes content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
©
 2017 Tax A
nalysts. A
ll rights reserved. Tax A
nalysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
DEBATING TAX
TAX NOTES, DECEMBER 11, 2017 1609
thereafter, Garry and Sheila form a partnership 
(the GS partnership) to invest in start-up 
companies. They approach Hilda and seek to hire 
her to manage their investments. The parties 
come to an agreement under which Garry and 
Sheila transfer to Hilda their partnership profits 
interests in the XYZ partnership in exchange for 
Hilda’s agreement to manage the GS partnership’s 
investments for 10 years. The value of the XYZ 
partnership interests that were transferred to 
Hilda is minimal because they provide no interest 
in contributed capital and the amount of the 
partnership’s future income is speculative. Thus, 
the amount of Hilda’s income from receiving 
those XYZ partnership interests is relatively 
small. The XYZ partnership proves to be 
successful and earns large amounts of long-term 
capital gains, which it distributes to Hilda and its 
other partners. Clearly, the distributions Hilda 
received from XYZ are not compensation for her 
services. She performed no services for XYZ. The 
compensation for her services was the receipt of 
the XYZ limited partnership profits interests. The 
distributions she received from the partnership 
are a return on her partnership interest and are 
taxed at capital gains rates. The same principle 
applies to the distributions to a managing partner. 
In the case of carried interest, the partnership that 
distributes its capital gains is also the one for 
whom the managing partner performs services, 
but just as in the XYZ situation, the payment for 
those services was the transfer of a partnership 
profits interest, and the subsequent distributions 
were returns on that partnership interest.
Example 2: Alex and Paul form a subchapter S 
corporation to invest in start-up companies. In 
exchange for their cash contributions to the 
corporation, they each receive stock and bonds of 
the corporation. The face amount of the bonds 
constitutes 85 percent of the amount contributed 
by the shareholders, and the value of the bonds 
equals their face amount. Thus, the value of the 
stock equals 15 percent of the amount that was 
contributed. The corporation wishes to use the 
services of Katherine to manage its investments. 
The corporation and Katherine agree that in 
exchange for her managing the corporation’s 
investments, Katherine will receive stock in the 
corporation constituting 20 percent of the 
corporation’s outstanding stock. The value of the 
stock that Katherine receives is ordinary income 
to her; but because of the corporation’s 
outstanding debt, the amount of her income is 
relatively small.43 The investments are successful, 
and the corporation earns substantial capital 
gains from selling them. The capital gain income 
of an S corporation passes through to its 
shareholders at the end of the corporation’s 
taxable year regardless of whether it is 
distributed.44 Thus, Katherine’s 20 percent share of 
the corporation’s capital gains is taxed to her as 
capital gain income at the end of the year in which 
the gains are earned. Katherine’s situation is 
almost identical to that of a managing partner 
except that Katherine will have ordinary income 
on the value of the stock when she receives it. But, 
the value of the stock is small so there is little 
practical difference in the situations. Indeed, if the 
2005 proposed regulations are finalized, the 
receipt of a partnership profits interest will be 
income to the managing partner, but because of 
the zero valuation provided by the safe harbor 
rule, he would usually incur no tax liability. There 
is little practical difference between having a 
small value for the stock and a zero value for the 
partnership interest. In principle, both are 
included in income at their respective values. 
Johnson states that the receipt of stock is different 
because the service provider gets a tax basis in the 
stock equal to the amount of income (that is, the 
value of the stock). Having a tax basis is 
equivalent to making an investment, and so 
Johnson apparently agrees that the return on that 
investment when Katherine receives her share of 
the corporation’s capital gains qualifies as capital 
gains. Therefore, if the IRS were to value a 
compensatory partnership profits interest at a 
figure greater than liquidation value, no matter 
how small, the managing partner would have a 
basis in his partnership interest. Johnson would 
agree that he would then qualify for capital gain 
treatment for partnership allocations to him. 
Johnson’s proposal to have a substantial 
difference in tax consequences turn on the 
43
Katherine’s stock represents 20 percent of the 15 percent of the 
amount contributed to the contribution by Alex and Paul. Thus, the 
value of her stock is 3 percent of the total amount contributed to the 
corporation. The reference to “contributed” in this footnote includes the 
amount paid by the shareholders to purchase bonds of the corporation.
44
Section 1366(a), (b).
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minuscule difference between having a zero basis 
in the appreciated property and having a minimal 
basis appears to us to be impractical and affords 
great consequence to insignificant differences.
It should be noted that Johnson buttressed his 
view for allowing capital gain treatment for the 
sale of stock in that it mitigates the double 
taxation that otherwise would apply. While 
double taxation does not occur in the case of S 
corporations, the principle the Erroneous Defense 
article espouses that having a basis in property is 
a justification for allowing capital gains treatment 
would apply to stock of an S corporation as well. 
Moreover, Johnson agrees that if the partnership 
profits interest were taxable to the managing 
partner when he receives it, the treatment of 
partnership distributions as capital gains would 
be appropriate. Ultimately, Johnson’s position is 
that the qualification for capital gains treatment 
depends upon whether the managing partner has 
or is deemed to have an investment in the 
partnership interest. We discuss that issue later in 
this article.
It is noteworthy that if the 2005 proposed 
regulations concerning the receipt of a 
compensatory partnership interest are finalized, 
the adoption of Johnson’s proposal would not 
make a significant change to the tax consequences 
of holding a carried interest. The 2005 proposed 
regulations provide a safe harbor in accordance 
with which the value of a compensatory 
partnership profits interest is deemed to be its 
liquidation value. But this safe harbor provision 
applies only if specific conditions are satisfied and 
if it is elected by the partnership and its partners.45 
Since Johnson’s proposed open transaction 
approach does not apply if the receipt of the 
partnership interest is taxable, a partnership 
could simply not elect the safe harbor, and the 
partnership interest would then be taxable to the 
managing partner. The value of the partnership 
interest is likely to be small especially in light of 
the power of the investing partners to terminate 
the partnership and leave the managing partner 
with little or nothing. Thus, for a relatively small 
tax cost, the managing partner would continue to 
qualify for capital gain treatment for his share of 
partnership income.
B. Exchange of Services
Johnson correctly notes that the exchange of 
services for the services of another (or for 
property) is a taxable exchange in which both 
service providers can have ordinary income. 
From that rule, he concludes that a managing 
partner should have ordinary income because he 
is providing services for another and not for 
himself. He concludes that if subchapter K46 
provides otherwise, it is flawed. He states that 
“Subchapter K . . . is supposed to be the servant of 
substantive tax law.” The problem with that 
approach is that the tax law operates in 
conjunction with property laws and other private 
laws. The nature of a partnership is a joint 
enterprise in which the individuality of the 
partners is merged to some extent in the entity. A 
partner who performs services in his partnership 
capacity is not considered to be performing it for 
the other partners. He is performing it for the joint 
enterprise of which he is a member. Consider the 
following example:
Example 3: John is an architect and Ralph is a 
builder. They form a partnership to construct an 
apartment building. John designs the building 
and creates blueprints for its construction. Ralph 
conducts the construction of the property. They 
are not treated as exchanging service with each 
other. Instead, they are treated as performing 
services in the joint enterprise of creating a 
building. They do not recognize income from the 
performance of their services. If, several years 
after completing the construction, they decided to 
sell the building for a gain, they would have 
section 1231 income, which likely will be treated 
as long-term capital gains. Even though much of 
the gain is attributable to the labor that they both 
contributed, their income may be taxed at capital 
gains rates. If the partners had managed the 
apartments so well as to increase the value of the 
building because of its positive reputation, the 
gain attributable to that labor also would be 
treated as section 1231 gain.
45
Prop. reg. section 1 83-3(l).
46
Subchapter K (sections 701-755) deals with partnership taxation.
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Similarly, the services performed by a 
managing partner are for the joint enterprise of 
acquiring stocks for future appreciation. The 
services are not performed for the investors. It is 
common for some partners to contribute capital to 
a partnership, other partners to contribute 
services, and some partners to contribute both. 
The income from the partnership as an entity is 
divided among the partners and characterized as 
it is in the hands of the partnership. That aspect of 
partnership taxation conforms to the private 
business law view of a partnership as a joint 
enterprise.
In the Erroneous Defense article, Johnson 
states that, “The fund managers are not building 
for themselves, however, but for others.” He 
disregards the partnership’s significance and 
treats it as a mere arrangement to turn 
compensation income into capital gains which he 
refers to as a kind of alchemy. To the contrary, the 
carried interest partnerships are not mere devices 
to obtain favorable tax consequences. They are 
formed for legitimate business purposes. The 
investors believe and expect that the synergy of 
their investments and the expertise of the 
managing partner will produce greater profits 
than they would obtain if they invested alone. Not 
all those investments will be successful, but many 
are. It is not the function of the courts, the IRS, or 
academics to second-guess the business decisions 
that the investors made. Of course, the tax 
consequences of doing business in a partnership 
form is taken into account by the parties. That is 
commonly done in choosing the type of entity in 
which to conduct a business. If carried interest 
partnerships were not formed for legitimate 
business purposes, they would not qualify as a 
business entity for tax purposes and would not be 
treated as a partnership under the tax law 
regardless of how classified for local law 
purposes.47
Johnson states, “a partner performing services 
is an agent of the partnership, just as an employee, 
officer, or independent contractor is an agent of 
the business for whom the services are provided.” 
It is true that a partner is an agent for purposes of 
being able to bind the partnership to agreements 
he makes on its behalf and in making the 
partnership liable for his negligence and poor 
decisions. But the partner is also a member of the 
partnership and is treated as self-employed. The 
partnership for whom he acts is an entity that 
consists of a melding of several persons, one of 
whom is the managing partner. When acting in 
his capacity as a partner, the partner is not treated 
as providing services for compensation but rather 
as performing his duties as a member of the 
partnership.
It is possible for a partner to perform services 
for a partnership for compensation. If a partner 
performs services that are not done in his capacity 
as a partner, the transaction will be treated as if it 
were between the partnership and someone 
unrelated to it.48 For example, if Paula is an 
attorney and a partner in a real estate partnership 
that becomes engaged in litigation, and if the 
partnership hires Paula to represent it in the 
litigation, Paula would not be providing her legal 
services in her capacity as a partner. In that case, 
the payments made to her for her services would 
be treated as compensation. The payments would 
be ordinary income to Paula and, depending 
upon the nature of the litigation, could be 
deductible by the partnership. That provision 
does not apply to managing partners since they 
provide their services in their capacity as 
partners.
There is one situation in which the payments 
made for services provided by a partner in that 
capacity are treated as compensation for some 
purposes. If the payment must be made without 
regard to whether the partnership has income, it 
is referred to as a “guaranteed payment.” A 
guaranteed payment is ordinary income to the 
partner who receives it and, depending on the 
nature of the services, may be deductible by the 
partnership.49 Guaranteed payment treatment 
applies only to payments to the extent that they 
are not dependent on the partnership’s income. 
For example, if the partnership agreement 
required that a partner be paid $20,000 annually, 
regardless of whether the partnership has income 
in that year, that would be a guaranteed payment. 
47
Reg. section 1.7701-1(a).
48
Section 707(a)(1).
49
Section 707(c).
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This provision does not apply if the payments to 
the service provider are based on a portion of the 
partnership’s income. A managing partner has no 
guaranty of a specified amount of payment, but 
rather receives a percentage of the income earned 
by the partnership. The guaranteed payment 
provision does not apply to carried interests. Note 
that guaranteed payments do not treat the 
partner’s services as having been performed for 
the other partners, but rather for the partnership 
as an entity.
The concept of a guaranteed payment was 
first adopted in the 1954 code. Before that, 
those payments were treated as partnership 
distributions rather than compensation.50 The 
courts had difficulty dealing with that treatment 
when the partnership’s income was less than the 
amount distributed. Congress adopted the 
guaranteed payment provision to clarify the 
treatment of such cases.51 The concept is based on 
the fact that partners share in the income and 
losses of the partnership. If the amount that a 
partner receives is not determined by partnership 
income, it looks more like a payment for services 
than an allocation of partnership profits.
C. The Scope of Capital Gains
There is no consensus on the function and 
purpose of capital gains treatment. It can be seen 
as serving multiple purposes. Johnson strongly 
adheres to the view that capital gain is restricted 
to appreciation of capital. Even if that is so, the 
managing partner’s “capital” is his partnership 
interest. Regardless of whether he has any basis in 
that interest, it is an item of property and thus is 
capital that can appreciate. The investment of 
money is not a condition of having capital. For 
example, Ralph inherits the property of his 
grandmother upon her demise. Among her 
properties, there is an old baseball. From all facts 
known at that time, the baseball is worthless, and 
so Ralph has a zero basis in the ball.52 Since Ralph 
has no positive basis in the ball, Johnson would 
say that he has no investment in it. Five years 
later, it is discovered from records recently 
unearthed that the ball was the last home run that 
Babe Ruth hit. The ball then is seen as a collector’s 
item, and Ralph sells it for $100,000. There is no 
reason that the gain from that sale should not be 
capital gain. If Ralph had purchased the ball for $1 
at a flea market, the ball would not be more of a 
capital asset than it was as an inherited item.
Johnson appears to agree that if Ralph had 
purchased the ball at a flea market for $1, he 
would have a capital gain of $99,999 on its sale. 
But he contends that if he inherited the ball with a 
zero value, he would have ordinary income of 
$100,000 on its sale. It seems also that Johnson 
would agree that if the ball were deemed to have 
a value of $1 when Ralph inherited it, he would 
have had a basis of $1 in the ball and so could have 
a capital gain of $99,999 on its sale. His positions 
are based on his contention that capital gain can 
apply only if the taxpayer has an investment in 
the item. He equates a positive basis with an 
investment, and so the presence of a basis 
becomes the crucial element for capital gains 
treatment according to his theory. Even if one 
were to accept that view, it is wrong to equate a 
zero basis with no basis. If an inherited asset is 
valued at zero, it is still an asset with a basis of 
zero that can increase in value. Johnson’s 
willingness to have a substantial difference in tax 
consequences turn on the minuscule difference 
between having a zero basis in the appreciated 
property and having a minimal basis appears to 
us to be more doctrinaire than principled.
In the Erroneous Defense article, Johnson 
states that, “Under current law, without basis, the 
gain from compensation is not the appreciation of 
capital, and is not capital gain.” This statement is 
made in support of treating a property interest 
received for services as capital only if the 
property’s value is taxable when received so that 
the recipient has a positive basis in it. In footnote 
8, the article cites two cases for that proposition 
(Vestal and Bryan), and neither of those cases is 
apposite. The Erroneous Defense article states 
that Vestal53 held that the sale of a partnership 
50
See Lloyd v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 82, 84-85 (1929).
51
Congress determined that the pre-1954 treatment of such payments 
was “unrealistic and unnecessarily complicated.” H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337 
at 68 (1954). See Douglas A. Kahn, “Proposed Regulatory Change of 
Treatment of a Guaranteed Payment from a Partnership to a Partner,” 5 
Mich. Bus. & Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 125, 130-131 (2016).
52
Section 1014(a).
53
Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1974).
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interest with zero basis was compensation, not 
capital gain. The case does not support that 
statement. In Vestal, the taxpayer had a 
contractual right to receive a transfer of a portion 
of the partnership interests that several limited 
partners held but only if specific conditions were 
satisfied. This contractual right was given as a fee 
for finding the investment. The conditions for 
transferring the partnership interests were never 
satisfied, and so the taxpayer never acquired a 
partnership interest. Instead, when the 
partnership interests of the partners were sold, 
the taxpayer received cash payments from those 
limited partners. The court held that the 
payments were made in accordance with a 
contract, not as a sale of a partnership interest. 
The Bryan54 citation is even more puzzling. The 
case involved the sale of corporate stock, and the 
gain recognized on the sale was treated as capital 
gain.
Johnson contends that the profits from an item 
produced by a taxpayer’s labor should be 
classified as compensation and, as a matter of tax 
policy, should be treated as ordinary income. He 
considers the failure to treat self-created property 
that way to be an exception that is allowed for 
administrative convenience. He points to the 
provision of the code treating gains from the sale 
of self-created literary and some similar items as 
ordinary income as evidence that taxing self-
created property at capital gains rates is a 
loophole. Let us examine the current treatment of 
profits from a taxpayer’s creations.
As Johnson notes, in the late 1940s, General 
Eisenhower sold the copyright to a book he 
authored, and the gain was taxed at capital gain 
rates. At that time, the sale of a self-created book 
or other composition by a person who was not a 
professional author could qualify for capital gain 
treatment. Congress later adopted section 
1221(a)(3) excluding from capital asset 
classification a copyright, literary, musical, or 
artistic composition created by the taxpayer. 
Johnson maintains that the adoption of that 
provision shows that Congress considered an 
allowance of capital gains treatment for any self-
created property to be a loophole.55 Conflicting 
with that view is the fact that Congress required 
ordinary income treatment only for several 
expressly listed types of self-created properties 
and left untouched all the others. If all self-created 
property should be excluded from capital gains 
treatment, why exclude only a few types? For 
example, a patent obtained for an invention is not 
included in the list in section 1221(a)(3) of items 
excluded from capital asset classification. Thus, a 
one-time inventor could sell the patent on his 
invention for capital gains. Not only did Congress 
leave patents off its list of excluded items, it left 
intact section 1235, a provision that allows a 
professional inventor (a modern-day Thomas 
Edison) to obtain capital gains treatment for a sale 
of his patents. Indeed, section 1235 applies capital 
gain treatment to the sale of patents far more 
liberally in several respects than is applied to the 
sale of items that are not self-created.56
In 2006 Congress added section 1221(b)(3), 
which grants taxpayers an election to have capital 
gains treatment for the sale or exchange of self-
created musical compositions. Since that 
amendment was adopted, the composer of a 
musical composition can sell it for capital gains 
even if he is a professional composer.
Clearly, Congress considers one function of 
capital gains treatment to be to encourage specific 
behavior. When dealing with investments, capital 
gain treatment encourages more investment 
because some of the profits can be taxed at lower 
rates. It is false that Congress has no interest in 
encouraging labor in some areas. Apparently, 
Congress deems it desirable to encourage 
inventions and musical compositions, but cares 
little for literary works. Self-created works require 
an investment of labor. There are ample reasons to 
encourage the creation of goods from labor just as 
there are reasons to encourage the creation of 
goods from the contribution of capital. In the case 
of hedge funds or venture capital funds, the 
acquisition of a distressed business to restructure 
it into a successful and profitable operation can be 
54
Bryan v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 972 (1951).
55
The Erroneous Defense article cites a committee report that 
characterized the prior treatment as a “loophole.”
56
Section 1235(a)(1).
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seen as a worthy enterprise to be encouraged. The 
change from a failing operation to a successful 
one benefits the public as well as those who 
invested in it.
In any event, in the case of carried interests, 
the capital gains are earned by the partnership as 
the product of the combination of the capital it 
acquired from its partners and the expertise of its 
managing partner. The gain resembles that of self-
created property in that it is the product of the 
capital and labor contributed by its partners; there 
is no dispute that the partnership’s gain is a 
capital gain. The partnership interest that the 
managing partner holds is not self-created 
property; it is property received as an advance 
payment for services to be performed.
The allowance of capital gain treatment for 
carried interests is not an outlier from the other 
properties that qualify. The treatment of carried 
interests comports with the partnership concept 
that was adopted by state laws and the federal tax 
law and is consistent with the capital gains 
treatment accorded throughout the tax law.
D. Income Exclusion of Partnership Interest
The Erroneous Defense article asserts that the 
core of the problem with the current treatment of 
carried interest is the failure to tax the managing 
partner on the receipt of a partnership profits 
interest. If the managing partner paid a tax on the 
receipt of that partnership interest, Johnson 
agrees that subsequent capital gain treatment is 
appropriate. Let us now consider the exclusion 
from income tax liability of the receipt of a 
partnership profits interest and its significance to 
the treatment of subsequent partnership 
distributions or allocations.
For federal tax purposes, the value of property 
is “the price at which the property would change 
hands between a willing buyer and a willing 
seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy 
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of 
relevant facts.”57 Johnson notes correctly that 
while the liquidation value of a carried interest at 
the time it is received is zero, the actual market 
value of the interest at that time is greater than 
zero. However speculative the success of the 
venture may be, someone surely would pay 
something for the prospect of making a profit. 
However, the amount they would pay is likely to 
be small, not because the prospects of gain are 
poor, but because the other partners have the 
power to cause the termination of the partnership 
and leave the managing partner’s interest with 
nothing more than the amount distributed on it in 
liquidation of the partnership (that is, a zero 
amount). It is unlikely that the other partners 
would promptly terminate the partnership, and 
so the carried interest does have value, but the 
transfer of that interest to a third party increases 
the risk that the partnership would be terminated, 
especially if, as often is the case, the carried 
interest is a general partnership interest. That risk 
of termination will reduce the market value of the 
carried interest, but it does not reduce it to zero.
In the 1931 Supreme Court decision Burnet v. 
Logan,58 the Court dealt with the sale of stock for 
which payment was to be made in installments 
based on the amount of iron ore mined and sold 
under a lease arrangement. Because of the 
difficulty in determining how much ore would be 
mined, the Court agreed with the taxpayer that 
the sale should be kept open and the taxpayer 
should treat each subsequent installment 
payment as a return of her basis. Once her basis 
was fully recovered, payments received in excess 
of her basis would be treated as capital gain 
recognized from the sale of her stock. The Court 
determined that the taxpayer’s right to 
installment payments had no “ascertainable fair 
market value” and so was not equivalent to cash. 
This treatment is sometimes referred to as the 
“open transaction rule,” the “open transaction 
approach,” or the “cost recovery method.”
The IRS resisted the taxpayer’s contention to 
keep the transaction open in Burnet. While it lost 
that case, the IRS has severely restricted the scope 
of the open transaction approach. The IRS’s 
position is that the FMV of an asset can be 
ascertained in almost all situations, and so the 
open transaction approach will apply only in rare 
circumstances. Reg. section 1.1001-1(a) states, 
“The fair market value of property is a question of 
fact, but only in rare and extraordinary cases will 
57
Reg. section 1.170A-1(c)(2).
58
Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
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property be considered to have no FMV.” The rare 
and extraordinary standard has been used by 
both the IRS59 and the courts.60 Courts usually 
adopt the IRS’s position and assign value to items 
even though the amounts to be received are 
speculative. For example, in Fleming,61 the court 
upheld a valuation of a right to receive payments 
based on a percentage of oil produced from wells 
— both existing and those planned to be built. In 
Clodfelter,62 the court upheld the Tax Court’s 
valuation of a right to receive a percentage of the 
income from the operation of a hotel. The Ninth 
Circuit went even further and held that the open 
transaction doctrine applies only if there is 
uncertainty regarding whether the taxpayer will 
recognize a gain; if it is clear that the taxpayer will 
recognize a gain, the court said, there is no 
requirement of ascertainable value.63
Treasury’s resistance to the open transaction 
approach is appropriate and justified. The open 
transaction’s use of subsequent installment 
payments as representing the FMV of the item at 
the time that it was sold is unrealistic. Congress 
illustrated its distaste for that approach when it 
adopted the Installment Sales Revision Act of 
1980.64 That act amended the code to permit 
installment reporting when the amount to be 
received by the seller cannot be readily 
ascertained because the amount is contingent.65 In 
those cases, if the installment method of reporting 
is elected, the seller’s basis is allocated ratably 
among the subsequent payments as contrasted to 
the cost recovery method used by the open 
transaction approach.66 Because of that 
amendment, the open transaction rule applies to 
even rarer circumstances.
The Burnet open transaction rule does not 
apply to the carried interest situation. In Burnet, 
the taxpayer received the right to installment 
payments on the sale of her stock, and the amount 
of those installment payments was determined by 
reference to a percentage of iron ore that was 
mined. The taxpayer did not receive an interest in 
the mine itself or in a lease of the mine. In contrast, 
the capital gain income that is distributed to a 
managing partner does not constitute installment 
payments on a sale of his services; instead, the 
gains are a return on the property (the partnership 
interest) that the taxpayer acquired as an advance 
payment for his services. Similarly, in Dorsey67 the 
taxpayer was entitled to installment payments 
from a sale of a patent, the payments measured by 
reference to a percentage of the income produced 
by the patent. The taxpayer did not have an 
interest in the patent itself. Even if the open 
transaction rule applied to carried interests, it 
would not affect the tax characterization of the 
managing partner’s receipt of partnership 
distributions. The rule would not treat the 
managing partner’s partnership interest as 
nonexistent. The distributions received on that 
partnership interest would be treated as such and 
not as deferred payments for the acquisition of the 
right to the partner’s services.
Moreover, Rev. Proc. 93-27, which is still 
viable since the 2005 proposed regulations have 
not yet been finalized, provides that, with three 
exceptions, the recipient of a partnership profits 
interest for services does not recognize income. 
Thus, there is no basis for treating subsequent 
distributions from the partnership as gain 
recognized by the partner from his agreement to 
perform those services.
A finalization of the 2005 proposed 
regulations would not change that result. The 
2005 proposed regulations do treat the receipt of 
the partnership profits interest as a taxable 
transaction, but those regulations allow an 
election to use the liquidation value of the 
partnership interest as its market value. As noted 
previously, the liquidation value is likely to be 
zero. That does not mean that the partnership 
interest has no readily ascertainable market value. 
59
Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15.
60
See, e.g., Estate of Marsak v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1961) 
(in valuing patent rights, the court said that while ascertainment of value 
may be difficult, it is only in rare cases that no value can be found). But 
see Dorsey v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 606 (1968) in which the Tax Court held 
that rights to the profits from exploitation of a patent had no 
ascertainable value.
61
Fleming v. Commissioner, 153 F.2d 361 (5th Cir. 1946).
62
Clodfelter v. Commissioner, 426 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1970).
63
Tribune Publishing Co. v. United States, 836 F 2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1988).
64
P.L. 96-471.
65
Section 453(f)(8)(B), (j)(2).
66
Section 453(j)(2).
67
Dorsey, 49 T.C. 606.
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To the contrary, it has a market value, and that 
value is to be treated as zero.
The Erroneous Defense article notes that the 
IRS has sought to apply an open transaction 
approach to many stock options that were 
received as payment for services. Options, 
especially stock options, were previously used as 
a device to compensate employees in such 
manner as to minimize their tax consequences. 
The options were valued at a low figure when 
issued and then no gain was recognized if the 
option was exercised at a highly favorable strike 
price. The options might also be encumbered by 
restrictions and conditions designed to lower 
their market value. The IRS and Treasury took a 
dim view of that practice and took steps to 
prevent it. Also, Congress adopted section 83 to 
deal with a similar compensatory scheme.
The IRS’s treatment of options is an exception 
to the its usual position. Reg. section 1.83-7(a) 
states that the granting of an option for services 
will be a taxable event unless the option does not 
have a readily ascertainable fair market value. 
Reg. section 1.83-7(b)(1) states that the value of an 
option “ordinarily” is not readily ascertainable 
unless the option is actively traded on an 
established market. Even if not traded on an 
established market, an option will have a readily 
ascertainable FMV if the conditions of reg. section 
1.83-7(b)(2) are satisfied. If the option does not 
have a readily ascertainable FMV, a type of open 
transaction applies and the taxpayer is taxed 
under section 83 when the option is disposed of or 
exercised.69
The treatment of options has no bearing on 
how to treat the distributions received on a 
partnership profits interest. The amounts taxed to 
the holder of an option are amounts received on 
the disposition of the option either by a sale or by 
exercising it. The distributions received by a 
managing partner are not from a disposition of 
the partnership interest, but rather are a return on 
that property. The managing partner continues to 
own and hold the partnership interest, which is 
not diminished by the distribution. Also, as noted 
above, the open transaction rule does not apply to 
those distributions because of Rev. Proc. 93-27 and 
the 2005 proposed regulations.
In his article, Johnson states, “The only 
rationale for not taxing a partnership interest with 
no immediate liquidation value is the open 
transaction rationale.” That the liquidation value 
of a carried interest is zero when it is received 
does not of itself trigger the open transaction 
approach. The requirement for applying that 
approach is that the property not have a readily 
ascertainable value; it does not matter that the 
ascertained value is zero, $1, or $1 million. The 
regulations under section 83 eliminate any doubt 
that a zero value does not trigger the open 
transaction rule.
Section 83(a) provides that the FMV of 
property transferred to a service provider for the 
latter’s services is taxable to the service provider 
at the first time that the property either is 
transferable or is not subject to a risk of forfeiture. 
Section 83 applies only to a transfer of property 
made to compensate for services performed. 
Section 83(b) grants the service provider an 
election to have the transferred property valued 
and taxed at the time of the transfer, in which case 
any restrictions on the property are ignored in 
valuing it. Neither section 83(a) nor 83(b) applies 
to a transfer at the time it is made if the transferred 
property has no readily ascertainable value.70 The 
election under section 83(b) can be made even 
when the service provider pays FMV for the 
property so that there is no bargain element in the 
transfer.71 In such a case, the transferred property 
effectively was partly sold and partly transferred 
as payment for services.72 Since section 83 applies 
only if property is transferred to a service 
provider as compensation for services, the 
regulation’s application of section 83(b) to the 
transaction means that Treasury considers there 
to have been a transfer of property to the service 
provider for his services. Because the recipient 
paid market value for the property, there was no 
distribution of that part of the property, and there 
69
Reg. section 1.83-7(a).
70
Reg. section 1.83-7(a).
71
Reg. section 1.83-2. The purpose of making the election is to 
prevent the application of section 83(a) to any appreciation of the 
property that is recognized on a subsequent disposition of it.
72
Section 83(b) can apply only if there is deemed to be a transfer of 
property to the service provider as compensation for services.
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had to be a deemed distribution of a portion of the 
property to the service provider. The value of the 
portion of the property deemed to have been 
distributed as payment for services was zero. Yet, 
the regulations provide that the section 83(b) 
election is available. The section 83(b) election is 
unavailable to a transfer in which the property has 
no ascertainable market value,73 and so the 
regulation’s statement that section 83(b) is 
applicable constitutes an acknowledgment that 
the compensatory transfer of property with a zero 
value does not cause the property to have no 
ascertainable value.
Johnson does not appear to contend that the 
open transaction rule applies to carried interests. 
Instead, he argues that the open transaction 
approach can be used to solve what he sees as the 
problem of allowing capital gain treatment for the 
partnership’s distribution of its capital gain 
income. As we discussed earlier in this article, 
Johnson’s view rests on his contention that the 
distributions should be seen as payments for the 
managing partner’s performance of services. We 
responded to that contention earlier in this article 
and believe that we have shown that it is incorrect. 
The “solution” that Johnson proposes is to a 
problem that does not exist.
If the Erroneous Defense article’s proposal to 
treat the distributions made to a managing 
partner as compensation for his services were 
adopted, it would have far-reaching 
consequences. Venture capital and equity and 
hedge funds are not the only partnerships that 
have partners who received a partnership profits 
interest as advance payment for their agreement 
to provide services. There are numerous 
partnerships in which some partners contribute 
property and some contribute their agreement to 
provide services. Many real estate partnerships 
have that arrangement. If the distributions to the 
partner who is the service provider are treated as 
compensation for services performed as an 
employee, the distributions would be subject to 
employment taxes. The imposition of those taxes 
would be inappropriate and costly.
Even if a carried interest were deemed subject 
to the open transaction rule (and we believe that it 
is not), it would not apply because the partnership 
interest would not be deemed to have no readily 
ascertainable value. As noted, the open 
transaction rule applies only in “rare and 
extraordinary” circumstances.74 The receipt of a 
partnership profits interest for an agreement to 
provide services is neither rare nor extraordinary. 
To the contrary, it is a common occurrence in the 
formation of new partnerships.
IV. Conclusion
A partnership’s distribution75 of a portion of its 
capital gain income to a managing partner is not 
compensation for the services performed by that 
partner. The managing partner received a 
partnership profits interest as an advance 
payment for his agreement to provide services to 
the partnership. The distributions received by the 
managing partner are his share of the 
partnership’s income to which he is entitled 
because of his holding a partnership interest. The 
managing partner is treated by the tax law the 
same as any other partner is treated. His share of 
the partnership’s capital gains is characterized as 
capital gains to him. There is no abuse to be cured.
Johnson’s Response — Last Words
by Calvin H. Johnson
Hard-fought debates tend to slide into less 
important details as they go on. Like a 
Mandelbrot fractal, as much energy and acrimony 
is spent on the increasingly trivial issues as on the 
broader scale. Readers, however, are less 
entertained by the warfare that gets into the 
trenches and smaller details.
Overall, Doug and Jeffrey Kahn offer a 
hypothetical in which the managing partner 
contributes no capital and has no basis in the 
73
See reg. section 1 83-7(a).
74
Reg. section 1.1001-1(a).
75
While we and other commentators refer to the taxation of 
“distributions” to a service providing partner, that term is used for 
convenience of discussion. As noted previously, the income recognized 
by a partner is not from a distribution of property to him but rather is 
from the allocation of the partnership’s income at the end of the year in 
which it is earned by the partnership. If the income is not distributed in 
that year and is distributed to the partner in a subsequent year, the 
distribution typically will not be income to the partner.
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fund. The manager takes out, for example, $1 
billion, attributable exclusively to managing. The 
managers have zero return from investment of 
basis, and all the return is a return to labor. The 
Kahns nonetheless advocate a tax accounting 
that makes all of the $1 billion capital gain, and 
none of it compensation. Tax accounting has a 
sacred duty of describing the economics. The 
Kahns’ accounting does not reflect the economic 
income. 
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